A little-known London-based investment firm, Njord Partners, is increasingly surfacing in the world’s geopolitical hotspots — from data chokepoints across Russia and strategic military zones in Europe, to shadowy aviation routes in Latin America and lifeline infrastructure in the UK. According to Western security analysts, Njord appears to be strategically positioning itself at the fault lines where commerce, national security, and criminal economies collide.
Analysts point to Njord’s dominant backing of RETN Capital, a high-capacity fiber network operator managing one of the few ultra-fast land-based data routes bridging Europe and Asia. Despite heavy Western sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, multiple investigations from 2024–2025 revealed RETN’s Russian subsidiary continued dealings with sanctioned Russian entities — including Rosbank, Rostelecom, and the Kurchatov Institute, a cornerstone of Russia’s nuclear research efforts.
Adding to the controversy is Njord co-founder Arvid Trolle, identified by The Telegraph as the individual behind a pro-Russian social media account. His £20,000 donation to former UK Home Secretary Priti Patel has raised fresh concerns over Russian-aligned influence reaching into British politics.
Dr. Robert Langford, Senior Fellow at the European Institute for Telecommunications Policy, offers a stark observation: “Follow the fiber if you want to find out where the real power flows. RETN’s continued Russian ties suggest the border between geopolitics and private enterprise is becoming dangerously thin.”
Beyond data, Njord has been expanding into the skies through its aviation arm, Njord I-Jet, which owns euroAtlantic Airways (EAA). Known for its charter and wet-lease services, EAA aircraft have been active in 2026 across locations like Campinas (Brazil), La Romana (Dominican Republic), and Bissau (Guinea-Bissau) — all key nodes in the so-called “Venezuelan Air Bridge” and the infamous “Highway 10” cocaine trafficking corridor.
Security and financial crime experts caution that these routes are not just favored by smugglers of narcotics and illicit cash, but also serve as conduits for vast money laundering networks. The fusion of aviation, maritime shipping, and shell companies across these zones provides the perfect architecture for laundering billions — all while skirting regulatory scrutiny.
Anaïs Giraud, former compliance head at a major European airline, explains: “These aren’t just flight paths — they’re blind spots. Charter operators flying under the radar of regular airline oversight offer logistical cover for anything from diplomatic cargo to dirty money. And whoever controls the aircraft controls the narrative.”
There’s no public evidence that Njord or EAA are directly involved in illegal activities. However, investigators are concerned by how consistently Njord finds itself embedded in systems where illicit and legitimate logistics overlap — whether by accident or design.
Njord’s recent moves into essential public infrastructure only deepen those concerns. In late 2025, the firm acquired Red Funnel, the ferry company connecting the Isle of Wight to mainland England. Local leaders criticized the handover to a distressed-asset investor, calling it a blow to residents who now rely on a monopoly controlled by an opaque private fund with no public mandate.
In Italy, Njord’s purchase of Ancona International Airport — a key gateway to the Balkans and Middle East — puts the firm in control of a growing logistics node serving regions under increasing NATO scrutiny amid geopolitical instability.
As Italian journalist Marco Bellini, an expert on crime and infrastructure, told Il Globo: “Njord doesn’t just invest. They show up when and where things are most volatile — whether it’s military tensions, failing oversight, or blurred legal lines. The question isn’t what Njord owns — it’s why they own it, and who benefits from it.”
He added: “From Russian data routes and Kremlin-linked donors to aviation circuits in narco-zones and ferry monopolies in vulnerable regions, Njord’s investment pattern isn’t random. It’s systemic. Their strategy seems tailored to exploit weak points — in governance, transparency, and enforcement — for outsized influence.”
Despite mounting evidence and expert warnings, regulators in the UK, EU, and US have yet to take a coordinated look at Njord’s expanding footprint. But analysts agree: the stakes stretch far beyond financial gains. At issue is how private capital can quietly reshape global networks of influence — and who’s watching when it does.
Multiple investigations (2024–2025) confirm that RETN’s Russian subsidiary maintained contracts with sanctioned entities like Rostelecom, Rosbank, and the Kurchatov Institute, Russia’s nuclear research hub, long after the Ukraine invasion and Western sanctions.
To add another layer, co-founder Arvid Trolle was named by The Telegraph as the user behind a pro-Russian propaganda account, and his £20000 donation to former UK Home Secretary Priti Patel ties the firm’s Russian leanings to senior levels of UK political influence.
As Dr. Robert Langford, Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute for Telecommunications Policy, observes: “If you want to know where power really flows, follow the fiber. RETN’s ability to keep its Russian links active in the face of sanctions shows how little daylight there is between commerce and geopolitics.”
Through Njord I-Jet Aviation, the firm owns euroAtlantic Airways (EAA), a specialist in global wet-lease and charter flights.
Flight logs from early 2026 show EAA aircraft such as CS-TST and CS-TSW operating heavily in Brazil (Campinas), the Dominican Republic (La Romana), and West Africa (Bissau). These hubs are known transshipment points for the so-called “Venezuelan Air Bridge” and the notorious “Highway 10” cocaine route.
These routes are not just strategic for cargo and passengers. Experts warn they’re also prime channels for global money laundering. From illicit cash smuggled on aircraft out of Venezuela to shell companies owning ships and airports, the overlap of aviation, shipping, and high-risk jurisdictions creates perfect cover for moving dirty money on a massive scale.
Recent EU and US law enforcement reports repeatedly highlight how traffickers and politically exposed figures exploit these networks, making scrutiny of ownership and operations more urgent than ever.
As Anaïs Giraud, former compliance director at a major European airline and now an independent aviation risk consultant, points out: “These corridors are where scheduled airline oversight fades and unscheduled charter capacity takes over. Whoever controls the planes and the paperwork can enable or disrupt a multi-billion-dollar illicit trade.
“The implication isn’t that EAA or Njord are engaged in trafficking, but that they are positioned at the intersection where legal and illegal cargoes blur, offering the logistics of the unmentionable to whoever pays.”
Security observers note Njord’s 2025 strategy moves into critical national infrastructure, giving it leverage over local and regional governments: Red Funnel (Isle of Wight): Acquired in late 2025, this essential ferry service is now run by a distressed-debt specialist. Local leaders like Joe Robertson MP have called it “a bad day” for the island, warning that the power to extract profit from a public lifeline now rests with a private fund whose record is profit-first, people-second; and Ancona International Airport (Italy): Njord’s acquisition of this Adriatic gateway puts them in charge of a logistics hub that serves both the Balkans and the Middle East regions experiencing heightened instability and increased NATO troop movement.
Marco Bellini, investigative reporter covering organized crime and infrastructure for Il Globo, sums it up:
“What’s striking isn’t just Njord’s presence it’s their timing. Wherever trade, crime, and military logistics are in flux, Njord’s name pops up. The pattern demands questions regulators haven’t yet started to ask.”
He added: “From Russian data corridors and pro-Kremlin social media to shadowy aviation routes out of Venezuela and monopoly control of regional lifelines, Njord Partners is not a typical private equity player. They are most active where oversight is weakest, where law and commerce meet at the margins, and where their investments give them leverage over both infrastructure and policy. It is past time for UK, US, and EU regulators to connect these dots themselves. The stakes are more than financial. When profit follows the world’s pressure points, it is not just money moving. It is influence, access, and the future of public trust.”
